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Frank Decker/Jared Sonnicksen 
The Direct Election of the Commission 
President 
A Presidential Approach to Democratising the Euro-
pean Union 
1.   Introduction 
It has become common knowledge by now that the European Union does 
not have it particularly easy when it comes to democracy. A commensu-
rately difficult task for political science is to analyse the EU in conven-
tional democratic-theoretical categories or to produce generally valid 
conclusions on the condition and necessity of democracy at the European 
level. This situation stems from four interlinking factors: (1) the functional 
and structural ambivalence of this sui generis political body, (2) the subse-
quent uncertainty with regard to the criteria to be used for evaluating the 
democratic quality of European governance, (3) the resultant differences in 
opinion as to which model is the most appropriate for democratising the 
EU, and (4) the continuing dissent on whether the EU – because of its pe-
culiar nature – can or should be democratised at all. It is precisely this un-
precedented character in turn that renders the analysis and assessment of 
democratic legitimacy in the European Union a difficult, if not hopeless 
endeavour.
1 
 
1   Lord, Christopher (2001): Assessing Democracy in a Contested Polity, in: Journal 
of Common Market Studies 39 (4), p. 641-661. 
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On the one hand, the EU represents substantially more than a conventional 
international organisation given the scope of the competences and areas of 
responsibility transferred to it; on the other hand, it encompasses only a 
fraction of those features that normally characterise a democratic-
constitutional state. Nonetheless, it would seem evident that politics take 
place in the European Communities, that the European Union can be con-
sidered a political system and thus a suitable case for study in comparative 
political science.
2 Despite this unique political system’s frequent classifica-
tion as sui generis, there is good reason to defy the taboo against subjecting 
it to comparative analysis. Granted, the EU may be a “one-of-a-kind kind 
of polity”, but then again, all political systems – not unlike people – are in 
sum unique. Furthermore, even if the EU is not itself a state, it can still be 
compared with other political systems constituted as states, if for no other 
reason than the common or unique (sui generis as it were) aspects of the 
EU’s institutional structure and functioning can only be captured by com-
paring it with other polities. Assuming that, we attempt in the following 
analysis to provide answers to two fundamental questions: we will examine 
which model of government most closely coincides with the European Un-
ion. Building upon that assessment of the development path taken by the 
institutions of the Community, we explore the opportunities and feasibility 
of realising such model as a step toward more democracy in European gov-
ernance.        
2.  The Preference for the Parliamentary Democratisa-
tion Approach 
2.1.   The Parliamentary Reform Model and its Merits  
The supporters of a parliamentary democratisation approach are in the 
overwhelming majority among academic critics of the EU democracy defi-
cit, or at least those who argue for an institutional path to reforming the 
 
2    Knelangen, Wilhelm (2005): Regierungssystem sui Generis? Die institutionelle 
Ordnung der EU in vergleichender Sicht, in: Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawis-
senschaften 3 (1), p. 7-33. The Direct Election of the Commission President 
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EU.
3 That the constitutional framers and scores of European political actors 
likewise gear their reform preferences toward the parliamentary model 
should come of no surprise, being already familiar with the parliamentary 
system of government in their home countries. With the exception of Cy-
prus, and Switzerland (the latter of course not belonging to the EU), all 
European countries have some form of parliamentary system. 
In accordance with the parliamentary approach, democratising the EU is 
synonymous with upgrading the European Parliament (EP). The coherence 
of this approach lies in the fact that the EP is the only institution in the 
European Union that can claim for itself direct democratic legitimacy. Ad-
vancing the position of the EP would involve two main areas. First, the 
EP’s powers and competences in the legislative process would be extended, 
placing it on par with the Council. Secondly, it should take over the ap-
pointment of the Commission president. The latter would be the decisive 
step toward a parliamentary system, characterised by a government that 
“emanates” from parliament and depends on its confidence. 
Adopting a parliamentary system in the EU would have the advantage of 
creating an arrangement akin to the political traditions of the member 
states. The EU would become easier for citizens to comprehend and iden-
tify with. At the same time, the EU would be able to take advantage of the 
virtues inherent to the parliamentary model.
4 They lie above all in the fu-
sion between executive and legislative, which generates a large degree of 
flexibility: When the government loses support in parliament, the instru-
ments of the vote of no confidence or the dissolution of parliament ensure 
that a new governing majority can be formed either within parliament itself 
 
3   E. g. Bogdanor, Vernon (2007): Legitimacy, Accountability and Democracy in the 
European Union. A Federal Trust Report, London. Mittag, Jürgen (2006): Wegmar-
ke für die Parlamentarisierung der Europäischen Union: Die finanziellen Neurege-
lungen des europäischen Abgeordnetenstatuts, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 
37 (4), S. 713-728. Holzinger, Katharina / Christoph Knill (2001): Institutionelle 
Entwicklungspfade im Europäischen Integrationsprozess: Eine konstruktive Kritik 
an Joschka Fischers Reformvorschlägen, in: Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 11 
(3), p. 987-1010. 
4   Cf. e.g. Linz, Juan (1990): The Perils of Presidentialism, in: Journal of Democracy 
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or through early elections. These mechanisms in turn provide the govern-
ment with substantial room for manoeuvre. In executing its programme, the 
government can rely on the support of “its” majority, which is reflected in 
the correspondingly high degree of party voting discipline. At the same 
time the opposition and the parliament as a whole check and scrutinise the 
government in order to take care that it does not diverge all too far from the 
will of the parliament and the people. Consequently, the parliamentary sys-
tem traditionally exhibits considerable policy-making efficiency and effec-
tive party-programmatic implementation.
5  
The advantages of the parliamentary approach to democratising the EU as 
postulated by its supporters can thus be summarised as follows. (1) The 
model meets the need for stronger democratic legitimacy in the European 
system of government, (2) it coincides with the national traditions of the 
EU member states and (3) it increases the governability of the EU. 
2.2.  The Drawbacks to the Parliamentarization Strategy 
A number of authors view the proposal to parliamentarize the EU rather 
sceptically. The main argument against this reform strategy is that the par-
liamentary model does not ‘fit’ the hybrid structure of the EU, which is 
characterised by a complex link between supranational and intergovern-
mental principles. The position of the Commission in the EU system of 
government, for instance, fundamentally depends on its national and parti-
san neutrality, which would be compromised by having the Commission 
tied to a parliamentary majority.
6 In a similar vein, the EP owes its current 
political weight to its independent institutional position, which would di-
minish if it became responsible for holding a European government in of-
fice. Hence, the notion that the political system of the EU already “leans” 
toward a parliamentary system, essentially waiting to be further developed, 
 
5   Katznelson, Ira (1994): British Parliamentary Democracy: Discussion, in: Political 
Science Quarterly 109 (3), p. 498-512. 
6   Majone, Giandomenico (1994): Independence versus Accountability? Non-
Majoritarian Institutions and Democratic Government in Europe, in: Joachim Jens 
Hesse / Theo Toonen (eds.): The European Yearbook of Comparative Government 
and Public Administration, Vol. I, Baden-Baden, p. 117-140. 
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seems fairly questionable. For instance, the degree of control over the 
Commission that the EP has on account of its motion of censure is often 
overrated.
7 This competence, as will be elaborated further on, is far from 
equivalent to the conventional vote of no confidence in parliamentary sys-
tems. 
Other critics doubt even more that the EU could even fulfil the structural 
conditions required in order to implement a parliamentary system. For one 
reason, parliamentary governments rely on highly developed parties capa-
ble of organising stable majorities that support a government. The deficient 
consolidation of the party system at EU level, especially compared to na-
tional party systems, poses from their critical viewpoint an insurmountable 
hurdle for this democratisation approach. Although European political par-
ties have organised along the left-right dimension, their pattern of interac-
tion scarcely resembles the dynamic à la government vs. opposition typical 
for parliamentary systems.
8  
The structural insufficiency for parliamentarization is illustrated not least 
by the elections to the European Parliament. Because there is neither a uni-
form electoral system, nor truly pan-European parties, these elections are 
organised at member state level and tend to be dominated by national poli-
tics. This situation is expressed concisely by the term “second-order elec-
tions”, which refers to two fundamental aspects of European elections. First 
of all, the EP elections are, at best, secondary in importance compared to 
national parliamentary elections, which continue to be the most significant 
for the electorate. Secondly – and even more disconcerting from a democ-
ratic standpoint – they are carried out by the national parties with predomi-
nantly national-oriented campaigns, and are quite frequently treated as 
 
7   Lenaerts, Koen / Amaryllis Verhoeven (2002): Institutional Balance as a Guarantee 
for Democracy in EU Governance, in: Christian Joerges / Renaud Dehousse (eds.): 
Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market, Oxford, p. 89-108. 
8   Tsebelis, George / Geoffrey Garrett (2001): The Institutional Foundations of Inter-
governementalism and Supranationalism in the European Union, in: International 
Organization 55 (2), p. 357-390. 
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“mid-term elections”.
9 One may only wonder how, under these conditions, 
these elections should generate a clear “mandate to govern”. Aside from 
the electoral dimension, the principle of degressive proportionality used for 
distributing seats in the EP infringes upon the democratic principle of 
equality and is not compatible with the conception of the EP as a “people’s 
chamber”.
10  
Upon closer inspection, it is equally questionable that the parliamentariza-
tion of the EU is presaged by the domestic traditions of the member 
states.
11 Whether the EU possesses an affinity for the parliamentary model 
– as supporters of this reform model claim – can not be determined based 
on the reform preferences of the European political actors, even less so if 
their perception of how the EU works turns out to be inaccurate. That this 
can occur is shown incidentally by studies regarding the political systems 
of the member states.
12 Even assuming that the EU’s path of institutional 
development more or less followed the traditions of its member states up to 
now, it certainly does not follow that a divergence from this path must be 
unacceptable: 
Firstly, there are ‘presidential’ elements already existent in the parliamen-
tary systems to varying degrees.
13 Some countries’ head of state are popu-
larly elected and endowed with more or less considerable powers. Other 
countries are familiar with the presidential system at lower levels of gov-
 
9   Blondel, Jean / Richard Sinnott / Palle Svensson (1998): People and Parliament in 
the European Union: Participation, Democracy, and Legitimacy, Oxford. 
10  Steffani, Winfried (1995): Das Demokratie-Dilemma der Europäischen Union. Die 
Rolle der Parlamente nach dem Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 12. Ok-
tober 1993, in: Steffani, Winfried / Uwe Thaysen (eds.): Demokratie in Europa. Op-
laden, p. 33-49. 
11  Gaupmann, Gloria (2008): Präsidentialismus als Leitmotiv für Europa? Eine neue 
Perspektive für die institutionele Weiterentwicklung der Europäischen Union, Mar-
burg, p. 289ff. 
12  In the case of Germany for instance, Werner Patzelt (1998) observed that the major-
ity of citizens there fail to grasp how the parliamentary system of government 
works; a significant minority (18 percent) even believed their political system to be 
a presidential system, while a third said they would prefer that system.  
13  Poguntke, Thomas / Paul Webb, Hg. (2007): The Presidentialization of Politics. A 
Comparative Study of Modern Democracies, Oxford. 
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ernment such as the direct election of mayors, as is the case in Germany in 
nearly all municipalities. If national parliamentary traditions were indeed 
so indelible, the citizens would be hopelessly puzzled by the introduction 
of a “foreign” element like the direct election of their municipal leaders – 
of course, the opposite appears to be the case.  
Secondly, the political systems of the member states encompass, within the 
framework of the parliamentary form of government, a wide spectrum of 
institutional arrangements, some of which more closely resemble, some of 
which significantly diverge from the EU polity. To assume that member 
state nationals will prefer a model of the EU system of government based 
on their “home” systems, though intuitively logical, would in fact be ab-
surd. Their majoritarian-democratic parliamentary system – or more pre-
cisely, their socialisation therein – does not hinder British politicians from 
pursuing a diametrically opposite type of system at the European level: a 
highly consociational, complex power-sharing arrangement, in which con-
sent among national governments remains the decisive foundation for le-
gitimacy.
14 Vice versa, the countries rooted in consensus democracy such 
as the Netherlands or Belgium have traditionally been the ones calling for 
more elements of majoritarian representative democracy in the European 
decision-making system. Accordingly, institutional inclinations seem to be 
fed primarily by broader visions of integration and the EU’s telos as op-
posed to native political traditions.          
3.  The Affinity toward Presidentialism 
3.1.  The Typology of Parliamentary vs. Presidential Systems of 
Government 
As the previous remarks illustrate, there is reason to doubt that the EU 
represents an incipient parliamentary system of government. This will 
 
14  Decker, Frank (2000): Demokratie und Demokratisierung jenseits des Nationalstaa-
tes: Das Beispiel der Europäischen Union, p. 611f., in: Zeitschrift für Politikwissen-
schaft 10 (2), p. 585-629. Frank Decker/Jared Sonnicksen 
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hardly change under the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon.
15 However, the 
question remains as to which system of government the European Union 
has developed or more closely resembles. Based on the dichotomous classi-
fication of types of government as parliamentary or presidential, first de-
veloped by the British scholar on parliamentarianism, Walter Bagehot 
(1867), all political systems can be categorised as one or the other form – 
including the EU. The core of this typology lies in the relationship between 
the executive and legislative, that is, the branches that constitute the de-
mocratic substance of a governmental system. 
Nonetheless, debate abounds on the existence of hybrid forms in addition 
to the “pure” forms. The extent to which one can identify mixed forms de-
pends on the criteria used. Following the scheme put forth by Winfried 
Steffani, who narrows the typology down to a decisive (single) differentiat-
ing factor, namely the removability or non-removability of the head of 
government (the prime minister) for political reasons, the possibility of hy-
brid systems can be dismissed.
16 Basing the typology on several criteria of 
equal significance on the other hand, as proposed by numerous English-
speaking political scientists, it becomes possible to identify other types of 
government in addition to the purely parliamentary and presidential 
forms.
17 
The intense discussion on possible hybrids was initially triggered by the 
“semi-presidential” system coined by Maurice Duverger.
18 This model re-
fers to a system with a parliamentary institutional framework, in which 
there is government headed by a prime minister responsible to parliament, 
but also a – usually popularly elected – president with governmental pow-
ers in addition to the role as head of state. While Steffani sees no reason to 
 
15  Höreth, Marcus / Jared Sonnicksen (2008), Making and Breaking Promises. The 
European Union under the Treaty of Lisbon, Bonn (ZEI Discussion Paper, C 181). 
16  Steffani, Winfried (1992): Parlamentarisches und präsidentielles Regierungssystem, 
in: Manfred G. Schmidt (ed.): Die westlichen Länder, München (Lexikon der Poli-
tik. Vol. 3, hg. von Dieter Nohlen), p. 288-295. 
17  Shugart, Matthew Soberg / John M. Carey (1992): Presidents and Assemblies. Con-
stitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, New York. 
18  Duverger, Maurice (1980): A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Gov-
ernment, in: European Journal of Political Research 8 (2), p. 165-188. The Direct Election of the Commission President 
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remove this type of government system from the dualistic typology, a large 
number of authors argue that it is removed far enough from the parliamen-
tary form to warrant consideration as its own type of system.
19  
Even if one disagrees with the latter view, one must still establish whether 
it is sufficient to reduce the criteria to the differentiating factor of remov-
ability / non-removability in order to preclude the possibility of mixed 
forms. Steffani argues that the negative criterion of removability / non-
removability essentially implies a certain type of procedure for appointing 
the government, rendering this criterion (appointment of government) sec-
ondary in significance as a differentiating factor for his typology. In doing 
so however, he overlooks three issues: Firstly, a presidential system can 
only fulfil democratic standards if the president enters office via democ-
ratic means. Thus, the “negative” factor, non-removability of the head of 
government for political reasons, must be supplemented by a “positive” 
factor concerning how the president is “appointed” or selected in order to 
be classified as a presidential system. Or put differently, an absolutist, he-
reditary monarchy can hardly be deemed a presidential system of govern-
ment. Secondly, appointment and removability do not necessarily need to 
coincide with each other institutionally. Just as it is possible for a non-
removable government to be appointed by parliament (Switzerland), it is 
equally conceivable to have a system where a directly-elected head of gov-
ernment remains dependent on the confidence of parliament (Israel 1996-
2001). And thirdly, the criterion of removability vs. non-removability of 
government for political reasons is indeed much more ambiguous than is 
often assumed. 
All three issues are exemplified in the case of the European Union. Thus, 
the following seeks to examine how the appointment and removal of the 
“European government” are addressed and regulated in the treaties and 
have occurred in practice. In order to be able to classify the EU system of 
government, the secondary criteria of the parliamentary-presidential typol-
 
19  E.g. Kailitz, Steffen (2006): Parlamentarische, semipräsidentielle und präsidentielle 
Demokratie – idealtypische und reale Unterschiede der politischen Strukturen und 
Prozesse, in: Uwe Backes / Eckhard Jesse (eds.): Jahrbuch Extremismus & Demo-
kratie (E&D), 18. Vol., Baden-Baden, p. 34-56. Frank Decker/Jared Sonnicksen 
12   
ogy will be consulted. In a further step, the executive structure will be ana-
lysed to determine whether the features of the semi-presidential system of 
government are fulfilled. 
3.2. Appointing  a  European “Government” 
The European Commission exercises the most important executive powers 
in the Community and will be – for the purpose of analogy – referred to as 
the European government. Its appointment involves a complicated proce-
dure. In most systems, political leadership is selected and legitimated, di-
rectly or indirectly, as a result of electoral competition. The administrative 
part of the executive branch, in contrast, is usually removed from electoral 
majority control so that the bureaucracy and agencies can serve the “com-
mon good” instead of pursuing particularistic majority interests.
20 The 
European Commission represents a distinctive combination of both aspects 
of the executive. In the role of administrative agency, the Commission pos-
sesses a much greater scope of authority than administrations in national 
political systems, which raises serious legitimatory concerns. On the other 
hand, its political competences do not extend nearly as far as those of na-
tional governments – thus, the Commission’s limited power coincides in 
turn with its deficient democratic legitimacy.
21  
Until 1994, the Commission President was appointed “by common accord” 
of the governments of the member states, assembled as the European 
Council. Since then, this procedure has undergone five changes, all of them 
geared toward increasing the democratic legitimacy of this office. Firstly, 
the investiture vote was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty (1992), on ac-
count of which the nomination of the European Council required the ap-
proval of the European Parliament. At the same time, an additional 
provision of the treaty adjusted the term of office of the Commission Presi-
 
20    Majone, Giandomenico (1994): Independence versus Accountability? Non-
Majoritarian Institutions and Democratic Government in Europe, p. 117ff., in: 
Joachim Jens Hesse / Theo Toonen (eds.): The European Yearbook of Comparative 
Government and Public Administration, Vol. I, Baden-Baden, p. 117-140. 
21   Sbragia, Alberta (2002): The Dilemma of Governance with Government, Cam-
bridge (Harvard University / Jean Monnet Working Paper 3/02), p. 2ff. The Direct Election of the Commission President 
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dent, which until then lasted four years, to match the five-year legislative 
period of the EP. Thirdly, the Treaty of Nice (2001) set forth that the Euro-
pean Council was to nominate a Commission President, no longer by 
common accord (i.e. unanimity), but rather by qualified majority. This rule 
was applied for the first time with the installation of the Barroso Commis-
sion in 2004. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, when nominating the Commis-
sion President, the European Council is to “take into account” the results of 
the EP elections, while the investiture vote has been advanced to a formal 
“election” of the Commission President by the Parliament (Art. 17 (7) 
TEU).
22 
The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty have not, however, changed the fun-
damental character of the appointment process. Because the candidate for 
Commission President is nominated by the qualified majority of the Euro-
pean Council, the candidate has a more highly legitimate position than pre-
viously, making it more difficult for the EP to reject the proposed 
candidate. Taking a closer look, it becomes clear that the EP does not have 
the power to “elect” the Commission, as the procedure is nominally and 
misleadingly referred to in the treaty, but rather a power to confirm. The 
actual power to nominate remains with the heads of state and government 
of the EU member states.
23 The previous voting results in the EP, normally 
a broad, cross-party majority for the Commission President, illustrate the 
confirmatory character of the EP’s role in the appointment procedure. 
Of course, the European Council is well advised to consult the European 
Parliament early on in the nomination process in order to ensure that the EP 
confirms its candidate. But the influence of the Strasbourg assembly re-
mains far from that of a positive appointment power. For instance, the re-
jection of France’s and Germany’s preferred candidate for Commission 
President, the liberal Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, in favour of 
 
22  The Treaty of Lisbon consists of the “Treaty on European Union” and the “Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union”, which replace the “Treaty establishing 
the European Community” (TEC). 
23  Höreth, Marcus (2004): Kontinuität oder Pfadsprung? Das institutionelle Dreieck in 
Europa nach dem Verfassungsvertrag, p. 1269, in: Zeitschrift für Politikwissen-
schaft 14 (4), p. 1257-1296. 
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the conservative Portuguese candidate José Manuel Barroso in 2004, re-
flected to a greater extent the changed political party and majority constel-
lation in the European Council (i.e. the parties in power in the member 
states) as opposed to the results of the EP elections. To pre-empt the Coun-
cil, the larger European political party groups in the EP could have cam-
paigned with top candidates for the office of Commission president, which, 
perhaps wisely, none of them have attempted in the past. Thus, pre-
requisite for true parliamentarization of the appointment procedure would 
be Europeanization of the EP elections, meaning that the elections revolve 
around European issues and candidates. Were that the case, the Council and 
the Parliament could swap their current roles in the appointment procedure; 
the treaty text would not even have to be amended. 
But the appointment process does not end with the enthronement of the 
Commission President. After the president assembles the team of commis-
sioners in concurrence with the member state governments, the Commis-
sion must be approved as a whole by vote of the Parliament before it can 
assume office (Art. 17 (7) TEU). A comparison with other constitutions 
reveals that a power to confirm the government is reserved to parliaments 
in several parliamentary systems (e.g. in Finland, Ireland, Sweden and 
Spain, as well as in Germany at the State or Länder level), although it is 
more the exception than the rule.
24 In presidential systems, confirmatory 
powers belong on the other hand to the usual “checks and balances” that 
serve to prevent a concentration of executive power. In the case of the 
United States, the requirement of the Senate’s “advice and consent” (Arti-
cle II, Section 2, Clause 2, US Constitution) applies to individual appoint-
ments by the President. This reflects a compromise in granting partial, but 
not unreserved legislative control over the executive, since a vote of disap-
proval against the president’s entire cabinet would, in effect, amount to a 
rejection of the president. In the EU on the other hand, the parliamentari-
ans’ vote of consent vis-à-vis the Commission as a whole apparently com-
pensates the EP for its lack of a positive power of appointment. Yet, the 
 
24  Ismayr, Wolfgang (2006): Die politischen Systeme Westeuropas im Vergleich, p. 
18f., in: Ismayr, Wolfgang (ed.), Die politischen Systeme Westeuropas, 3. Auf., 
Wiesbaden, p. 9-52. The Direct Election of the Commission President 
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failed first attempt at confirming the Barroso Commission clearly showed 
how awkward this rule is, particularly in light of the Commission Presi-
dent’s position in the cabinet-building process. It would only be practicable 
if the Commission President had genuine latitude in selecting the members 
for the Commission, as provided for in the draft constitution proposed by 
the Convention.
25 In that case, the Commission President could consult the 
Parliament beforehand, take its preferences into consideration and thus be 
able to ensure EP support for the Commission. Under the current arrange-
ment, the president’s hands are tied by the individual member states. Con-
sequently, the first rejection of a Commission by the EP (October 2004) 
may have been ostensibly directed at the allegedly unsuitable Commission 
nominees; the real object of disapproval were the heads of state and gov-
ernment and their disregard of the EP’s preferences.  
3.3.  The Vote of Censure against the Commission 
Justifiably, the EP’s rebellion has been interpreted as a “sign of more par-
liamentarianism in Europe”. That this comment stems from Hans-Gert Pöt-
tering, at that time chair of the EPP group in the parliament, appears 
remarkably schizophrenic since it was the Christian Democrats and Con-
servatives who promised to support Barroso in the first place. Thus, more 
parliamentarianism in the EU cannot be equated with a transition to a par-
liamentary-style system of government. The institutional position of the 
European Parliament can be viewed more aptly as hermaphroditic, combin-
ing features of parliamentary and presidential systems, though the relations 
between the parliament and the Commission tend to demonstrate a greater 
affinity toward the separation of powers intrinsic to presidentialism. The 
latter is reflected in the rules on the censure vote (Art. 234 TFEU), which 
are closely linked with the appointment procedure.  
According to the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission, “as a body, shall be re-
sponsible” to the European parliament (Art. 17 (8) TEU), signifying at a 
first glance a parliamentary system. But one should reject viewing this pro-
 
25 It was planned to allow the Commission President to choose for each Commission 
position one from three nominees proposed by the member states. This arrangement 
was later dropped by the Heads of State and Government (Höreth 2004: 1267). Frank Decker/Jared Sonnicksen 
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vision as equivalent to the normal parliamentary power of removability for 
two reasons: firstly, for the EP vote of censure to be successful, it must be 
carried by a two-thirds majority, whereas the absolute majority suffices for 
the investiture of the Commission. Such a disparity between appointment 
and removability of government is unparalleled among parliamentary de-
mocracies.  Secondly – and linked to the first – the removability of the 
Commission is not contingent upon “political” reasons, but rather serves as 
a sanction against the Commission or Commissioners for legal or ethical 
misconduct, as demonstrated by the (failed) motion of censure against the 
Santer Commission in January 1999.
26 Moreover, the Parliament has tried 
in vain to extend its power of censure from the Commission as a whole to 
individual Commissioners. This likewise attests, if only indirectly, to how 
“unparliamentary” the EP’s censure vote is. If this power were based on the 
political principle of removability, the EP would be capable of effecting 
individual resignations merely by threatening a “vote of no confidence”.
27 
In the European Union, the rule depicts a legal principle (disguised as a po-
litical procedure) that resembles the American impeachment much more 
than the motion of censure
28 in the parliamentary governmental sense. Like 
the power to approve appointments, this rule constitutes a typical feature of 
presidential systems. 
Applying the further (secondary) criteria of the parliamentary vs. presiden-
tial typology, we get an even more complete picture. For instance, neither 
the Commission, nor the Council (Council of Ministers or European Coun-
cil) have the power to dissolve the European Parliament, which is normally 
 
26  Lautz, Andreas (1999): Das erste Misstrauensvotum des Europäischen Parlaments 
gegen die Europäische Kommission, in: Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 9 (2), p. 
439-459. 
27   Precisely for this reason, the principle of ministerial responsibility has become 
widely obsolete in the political practice of parliamentary systems. The political vote 
of no confidence endows the parliament with sufficient pressuring capability to 
bring about the dismissal of individual ministers. 
28  The English treaty text uses “motion of censure”; the term is synonymous with vote 
of no confidence in a number of EU countries (e.g. France motion de censure, Spain 
moción de censura, Dutch Motie van Afkeuring) and is used as such in the respec-
tive versions of the treaty. The same applies to the German version Misstrauensan-
trag or Swedish Misstroendevotum, literally “vote of no confidence”.  The Direct Election of the Commission President 
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the counterpart to the political removability of the government by parlia-
ment in parliamentary systems. In 2001, the former French Prime Minister 
Lionel Jospin proposed introducing a power to dissolve the EP,
29 but his 
idea was not taken up by the Constitutional Convention. An additional “fit” 
with the presidential system is the (de facto) incompatibility between ex-
ecutive office (in the Council and Commission) and seat in Parliament, 
though it is not explicitly prohibited. Naturally, this does not constitute a 
necessary differentiating factor as a number of parliamentary systems also 
abide by the principle of incompatibility. 
With regard to legislative powers, the EU becomes more difficult to cate-
gorise.
30 One the one hand, the Commission has the power of legislative 
initiative – even a monopoly of initiative in the “first pillar” – typical of 
parliamentary governments. On the other hand, the Commission possesses 
a quasi-veto reminiscent of presidential or semi-presidential systems as it 
can withdraw or amend its proposals at any time in the legislative process. 
Under the Treaty of Lisbon (Art. 293 (2) TFEU), the Commission will 
maintain this right, which is supposed to help ensure that the legislative 
institutions, Council of Ministers and European Parliament, cannot depart 
from Commission proposals arbitrarily. Certainly the EP would prefer to 
have this power removed or at least limited to the initial stage of the legis-
lative process in order to strengthen its own lawmaking influence. 
All the same, the Commission’s right of withdrawal is linked to the EU 
provision that all regulations, directives and decisions made by the Council 
and Parliament must originate from a proposal by the Commission (Art. 
289 (1) TFEU). The Commission monopoly of initiative is a rather unpar-
liamentary idiosyncrasy of the EU that arises out of the institutional linkage 
between supranational and intergovernmental forms of integration. As a 
result, the Council cannot make decisions, even by unanimity, independent 
 
29  Jospin, Lionel (2001): Europa schaffen, ohne Frankreich abzuschaffen. Rede zur 
Zukunft des erweiterten Europas vom 28. Mai 2001, abgedruckt in: Blätter für 
deutsche und internationale Politik 46 (7), S. 889-896. 
30  Gaupmann, Gloria (2008): Präsidentialismus als Leitmotiv für Europa? Eine neue 
Perspektive für die institutionele Weiterentwicklung der Europäischen Union, Mar-
burg, p. 245f. Frank Decker/Jared Sonnicksen 
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of the Commission. This serves to prevent future governments from being 
able to downgrade the achieved level of integration via the normal legisla-
tive procedure. One may doubt that the EP could pose a similar threat. 
Granting it the right of initiative, however, would pose the question as to 
how the Commission should be adequately involved in the legislative pro-
cedure when the EP initiates.
31 This question would be superfluous in a 
parliamentary system. The lack of legislative initiative will most likely re-
main one of the deficits that characterise the Strasbourg assembly and dis-
tinguish it from “normal”, democratic parliaments – from the violation of 
the principle of equality regarding the distribution of seats, the non-uniform 
electoral procedure to its lower position as a legislative body vis-à-vis the 
Council.      
3.4. Bicameralism 
The latter involves another secondary feature which can be considered for 
categorising parliamentary and presidential systems. Characteristic of the 
parliamentary system of government is the “fusion of powers” between the 
executive and legislative in the form of governing majority pitted against 
the parliamentary minority or opposition. A situation in which the govern-
ment must share legislative power with a second parliamentary chamber 
could prove frustrating for the rivalry between (governing) majority and 
(opposing) minority, most of all to the former if the latter has a majority in 
the second chamber. Thus, unsurprisingly, second chambers with equal or 
nearly equal powers (as in Germany or Australia) represent an exception 
among parliamentary systems.
32 
 
31  An alternative option for upgrading the EP would be an extension of the already-
existing right to request legislative proposals from the Commission (Art. 225 
TFEU). For example, these requests from the EP for legislative proposals could be 
made binding for the Commission. 
32  A further example would seem to be the Italian Senate. Its on-par footing with the 
first chamber (Chamber of Deputies) is also reflected in the fact that it shares equal 
power with the Chamber of Deputies in appointing and, if applicable, removing the 
government – a considerable divergence from other parliamentary systems. Because 
the elections to the Senate occur simultaneously with elections to the Chamber and 
according to similar rules, the party-political composition of both houses tends not 
to differ much. This on the one hand precludes the possibility of divided govern-The Direct Election of the Commission President 
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On the contrary, they fit quite well into the power-separating logic of presi-
dential systems with their lack of institutionalised governing majority vs. 
opposition. In order to countervail their feared dominance of the legislative 
branch, the U.S. founding fathers consciously opted for a fully bicameral 
legislature, in which the Senate and House of Representatives would check 
and balance one another. This should by no means suggest that presiden-
tialism relies on this type of balance-of-power structure in its legislative 
branches. Indeed, nearly half of all presidential systems (almost exclusively 
in Latin America) operate with unicameral legislatures.
33 Where second 
chambers do exist in presidential systems, they are almost always endowed 
with powers equal to the first chamber, whereas in parliamentary systems 
the democratically constituted “popular chamber” is nearly always the 
more powerful one. This difference is also reflected in the fact that the 
terms “first” and “second” or “upper” and “lower” chamber are not com-
monly used in the context of presidential systems. 
In the EU, the bicameral logic is even magnified by the slight predomi-
nance of one “chamber” in the legislative process – precisely that chamber 
that is not organised according to the principle of democratic equality. 
Here, any legal act must be passed by the Council, but not necessarily by 
the European Parliament. Even if there were a fusion of powers between 
the Commission and the Parliament, the former hence being appointed and 
held in office by a majority in the latter, the Council as an independent in-
stitution could and would still play such a strong role in the legislative 
process that nothing could be passed against its will. In this respect as well, 
the institutional system of the EU diverges significantly from the power-
fusing design of the parliamentary system of government.
34  
 
 
ment for the most part. But it raises the question as to why it is necessary at all to 
have a second chamber of parliament that is nearly identical in structure and func-
tion to the first chamber.  
33  Kailitz, Steffen (2008): Zwei Seiten der gleichen Medaille? Zum theoretischen und 
empirischen Zusammenhang zwischen der Regierungsform und der Ausgestaltung 
von Zweikammersystemen, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 39 (2), p. 387-414. 
34  Bogdanor, Vernon (1986): The Future of the European Community: Two Models of 
Democracy, p. 174, in: Government and Opposition 21 (2), p. 161-176. Frank Decker/Jared Sonnicksen 
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3.5.  The Divided European Executive as Semi-presidential Ar-
rangement 
Up to now, we have assumed that the governing function in the EU is pri-
marily carried out by the Commission and the legislative function by the 
various Council formations and the Parliament. To be sure, this only pro-
vides a limited picture of the complex reality of European governance. Just 
as the Commission participates in the legislative process, so does the 
Council serve as an executive institution, both functionally and structurally. 
That the Lisbon Treaty will extend its executive powers corresponds with 
the interdependency between supranational and intergovernmental institu-
tion-building characteristic of the EU.
35 The numerous institutional innova-
tions in the Lisbon Treaty include, firstly, the formal incorporation of the 
European Council as an institution of the EU, now charged explicitly with 
the function of providing the impetus for future development and defining 
“the general political direction and priorities” of the Community (Art. 15 
(1) TEU). Secondly, the office of a President (of the European Council) 
was established, who will be elected by the heads of state and government 
by qualified majority for two-and-a-half years, renewable once (Art. 15 (5) 
TEU). In contrast to the current Council presidency, the future president 
may not hold a national office during her or his tenure. The candidate can 
only be recruited outside of the circle of acting heads of government or 
state – or, if applicable, must at least resign from that office upon appoint-
ment. Thirdly, the office of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy has been upgraded institutionally, even though nominally it 
is a step down from the title of “Foreign Minister” as originally envisioned 
by the Constitutional Treaty. According to the “double hat” arrangement, 
the High Representative will serve as a member of the Commission (as its 
Vice-President), but also as chair of the Foreign Affairs Council (Art. 18 
TEU), deviating from the principle of the rotating Council presidency. 
 
35  Decker, Frank (2002): Institutionelle Entwicklungspfade im europäischen Integrati-
onsprozess. Eine Antwort auf Katharina Holzinger und Christoph Knill, p. 614f., in: 
Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 12 (2), p. 611-636. The Direct Election of the Commission President 
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In general, the double or dual executive represents a typical feature of the 
parliamentary form of government.
36 While the functions of head of state 
and head of government are merged into one office in presidential systems, 
they remain institutionally separate in parliamentary ones. But the parlia-
mentary systems of South Africa or Botswana – or at the Länder level in 
Germany – show that exceptions are possible. Conversely, a dual executive 
in a presidential system is theoretically imaginable. The difference of dual 
vs. unified executive is thus not born out of a functional necessity for par-
liamentary and presidential systems respectively, but is rather explainable 
in historical terms – that is based on the historical development of both 
types of system. 
Among the systems with a dual executive, the question posed for political 
scientists is how power is divided between the two institutions. In most par-
liamentary systems, the head of government tends to be the more powerful, 
if not de jure, then de facto, while the president (or monarch) is relegated to 
the symbolic, ceremonial tasks of head of state. In other cases, the president 
has significant political powers that make this office a potential part of the 
government. Determining who the real “chief executive” is becomes diffi-
cult. This can depend on the constitutional provisions and their interpreta-
tion in practice, but also on the party-political situation, i.e., who is in the 
majority and where. Exemplary for this semi-presidential type of system is 
the French Fifth Republic.  
The parallels to the EU polity are fairly obvious. In the area of the execu-
tive, the responsibility for governing falls both on the Commission and the 
Council. Aside from the office of the High Representative and how it is 
structured under Lisbon, the heads of both executive branches are institu-
tionally separated. Within this framework there is a series of functional 
overlaps that are foreign to the national political systems with dual execu-
tives. For example, the Commission has a strong leadership instrument 
through its monopoly of legislative initiative, cutting into the role of the 
European Council as provider of “general political direction and priorities”, 
 
36  Steffani, Winfried (1992): Parlamentarisches und präsidentielles Regierungssystem, 
in: Manfred G. Schmidt (Hg.): Die westlichen Länder, München (Lexikon der Poli-
tik. Band 3, hg. von Dieter Nohlen), S. 288-295. Frank Decker/Jared Sonnicksen 
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and is by no means reduced to the classic executive functions of monitoring 
and implementing policy.  
Within the Council, the heads of state and government in turn share leader-
ship with the semi-annually rotating Council presidency. The latter has 
evolved into an increasingly important agenda-setter, whose working pro-
gramme can make the difference between stagnation and progress in Euro-
pean politics.
37 And, as if the complexity were not high enough yet, the 
Treaty of Lisbon will bestow executive tasks upon the newly-established 
President of the European Council, rendering the “executive branch” of the 
EU even more diffuse. The President is supposed to promote the cohesion 
and continuity of the European Council and provide impulses for the Coun-
cil, but also ensure the representation of the EU in external affairs – “with-
out prejudice to the powers of the High Representative” (Art. 15 (6) TEU). 
At the same time, this suggests that the President of the European Council 
is to grow into the role of a representative “head” of the European Union 
that, until now, has been mainly exercised by the Commission President.
38       
Fig. 1: Structure of the EU-Executive   
 
 
 
 
37  Schout, Adriaan / Louise van Schaik (2008): Reforming the EU Presidency?, in: 
Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften 6 (1), S. 36-56. 
38  Staeglich,  Simone  (2007): Der Kommissionspräsident als Oberhaupt der Eu-
ropäischen Union. Vom primus inter pares zur europäischen Leitfigur, Berlin. 
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Because the EU – as shown above – lacks the central features of a parlia-
mentary system, the analogy should not be overstretched.
39 This applies all 
the more considering that the EU fails to fulfil another essential element for 
classification as a semi-presidential system according to Duverger, namely, 
the popular election of the president. The comparability is thus reduced to 
the distribution of power(s) with the executive, where the Commission and 
Council or the Commission President and the President of the European 
Council “rival” one another. It remains to be seen whether this diffuse 
structure perpetuated and even intensified by the Treaty of Lisbon will en-
tail additional potential for gridlock and impairment of the EU institutional 
performance and efficiency.
40 If such risks are impending, they would most 
likely to be posed by the Council as a whole and less by the newly created 
offices of the President and High Representative. This would be one reason 
why a popular election of the President of the European Council
41 would 
not bring the EU much further, either politically or democratically. To pre-
vent a further shift of power toward intergovernmentalism, efforts to de-
mocratise the EU system of government need to be directed at the 
supranational institutions, Parliament and Commission. In the following 
section, we discuss whether the direct election of the Commission President 
offers a suitable approach. Before doing so, we provide below an overview 
of the parliamentary and presidential features of the European system of 
government.  
 
39   Knelangen, Wilhelm (2005): Regierungssystem sui Generis? Die institutionelle 
Ordnung der EU in vergleichender Sicht, in: Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawis-
senschaften 3 (1), S. 7-33. 
40  Kurpas, Sebastian et. al. (2007): The Treaty of Lisbon: Implementing the Institu-
tional Innovations, Brüssel (Egmont / European Policy Centre / Centre for European 
Policy Studies). 
41  Such a proposal was made recently by the German Minister of Interior, Wolfgang 
Schäuble. Frank Decker/Jared Sonnicksen 
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Fig. 2: Parliamentary and presidential features of the EU system of 
government 
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4.  The Direct Election of the Commission President 
as a Democratisation Approach 
4.1.  Direct Election and Presidential Functional Logic 
Given the affinity of the European institutional system to presidentialism, it 
is astounding how few supporters there have been for a presidential democ-
ratisation approach in the EU reform discussion. In a number of academic 
overviews concerning the democracy deficit and reform options, the possi-The Direct Election of the Commission President 
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bility of introducing the direct election of the Commission President is not 
even mentioned,
42 despite the fact that the presidentialism hypothesis is ac-
tually not all that new. Originally postulated by British political scientist 
and legal scholar, Vernon Bogdanor,
43 on the occasion of the Single Euro-
pean Act, the first major reform of the institutions of the European Com-
munity, the notion was further developed by Simon Hix and continues to be 
put forward in the reform discussion.
44 In the context of the debate on a 
constitution for Europe, the introduction of a directly elected Commission 
President was furthermore proposed by then German Foreign Minister Jo-
schka Fischer and later by former Irish Prime Minister John Bruton.
45 
In the course of the Convention however, Fischer for example distanced 
himself from his famous speech at the Humboldt University and sided with 
the supporters of the parliamentary reform model. Even more remarkable 
though is the about-face by the originator of the EU presidentialism con-
cept, Bogdanor. Not only does he unequivocally recommend the parliamen-
tary system as the suitable form of government and democratisation 
approach, he also bases his concept on the British model, which as a strict 
majoritarian system could be difficult to impose upon the heavily consen-
sus-oriented structure of the European decision-making system. Nonethe-
less, Bogdanor seeks to reconcile the two, the EU political system with 
Westminster democracy. Consequently, his proposal extends further than 
 
42  E.g. Kohler-Koch, Beate / Berthold Rittberger, Hg. (2007): Debating the Democ-
ratic Legitimacy of the European Union, Plymouth. 
43  Bogdanor, Vernon (1986): The Future of the European Community: Two Models of 
Democracy, in: Government and Opposition 21 (2), p. 161-176. 
44  Hix, Simon (1998): Elections, Parties, and Institutional Design. A Comparative Per-
spective on European Union Democracy, in: West European Politics 21 (3), S. 19-
52. Cf. Decker, Frank (2000): Demokratie und Demokratisierung jenseits des Na-
tionalstaates: Das Beispiel der Europäischen Union, in: Zeitschrift für Politikwis-
senschaft 10 (2), S. 585-629. 
45  Fischer, Joschka (2000): Vom Staatenbund zur Föderation. Speech delivered at 12 
Mai 2000 at the Humboldt-University in Berlin, 12 Mai 2000, printed in: Christian 
Joerges / Yves Mény / Joseph H.H. Weiler (eds.): What Kind of Constitution for 
What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer, San Domenico, p. 5-17. 
Bruton, John (2003): A Proposal for the Appointment of the President of the Com-
mission as Provided for in Article 18.bis of the Draft Constitutional Treaty. Contri-Frank Decker/Jared Sonnicksen 
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the mainstream approach for parliamentarizing the EU by suggesting – be-
yond linking the appointment of the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment elections – that the partisan composition of the entire Commission 
reflect the majority party or parties in the EP that “elect” it. According to 
Bogdanor, because the EP is already in a position to push through a more 
party-political election of the Commission, democratising the EU along the 
parliamentary developmental path would not even require changes to the 
existing treaties. This constitutes the main advantage of this model over the 
presidential direct-election concept.  
Even taking the last argument
46 at face value, the question remains as to 
why the Parliament and the parties represented there should bring them-
selves to adopt such a strategy, which they could have done at any time in 
the past. Since they have not up to now, for whatever reason, the institu-
tional and political framework would need to have changed in such a man-
ner that now provides the necessary incentives for the EP members to 
assert themselves in the Commission appointment; this does not seem to be 
the case. Perhaps even more important than the formal pre-requisites are 
the substantive conditions regarding system compatibility or “fit”. A key 
factor here is the party system. Holzinger and Knill point out appropriately 
that the suitability of a concept for democratisation will ultimately depend 
on the demands it places upon the political parties and their Europeaniza-
tion.
47 A comparison between the parliamentary and presidential models 
and their respective functional logics reveals that the level of coherency 
and consolidation necessary for a parliamentary system to work is signifi-
cantly higher than in the presidential model. The political linkage or 
“common destiny” between government and parliamentary majority, upon 
 
bution from John Bruton T.D., Member on the Convention on the Future of Europe, 
for Consideration by the Convention, January 6th, 2003 (CONV 476/03). 
46  The argument might be put forth for introducing a constitutional provision for al-
lowing for the dissolution of parliament (non-existent in the EU system) and calling 
of early elections, which is in place in all parliamentary systems except Norway. 
Bogdanor however does not address this point. 
47  Holzinger, Katharina / Christoph Knill (2001): Institutionelle Entwicklungspfade im 
Europäischen Integrationsprozess: Eine konstruktive Kritik an Joschka Fischers Re-
formvorschlägen, p. 1006f., in: Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 11 (3), p. 987-
1010. The Direct Election of the Commission President 
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which the parliamentary system rests, can only be sustained if the political 
parties have developed a high degree of programmatic and organisational 
cohesion. The current European party system on the other hand is, at best, 
only partially consolidated, the most progress having been achieved on the 
organisational side. A presidential system however can manage without 
well-organised, advanced party structures. For one, the head of government 
possesses legitimacy independent of parliament on account of the popular 
election of the president and can remain in office regardless of the legisla-
ture’s support or “confidence”. The parliament as an institution as well as 
the individual members for their part are in a comparatively comfortable 
position to compete with or confront the executive, as there is no need for 
(party) political unity between the two governing institutions that obliges 
MPs to adhere to party discipline. 
To assume that this renders the parliament weak – because it lacks power to 
appoint the government – would be severely erroneous. Though counterin-
tuitive, the example of the United States Congress illustrates that particu-
larly those parliaments are powerful that are primarily limited to 
lawmaking tasks.
48 This helps to explain the relatively strong position, 
compared to national parliaments, of the European Parliament. While not 
on an equal footing with the Council in all policy areas, when it can co-
decide, the EP wields considerably more influence than its counterparts at 
national level, where parliaments over time have fallen behind their respec-
tive governments who have come to dominate the legislative process. Be-
cause members of the parliamentary majority are not “allowed” to govern, 
while members of the parliamentary minority are not “able” to govern, the 
parliamentary system of government can prove rather frustrating at times 
for the members of parliament. Were they to become responsible for form-
ing a European government, the representatives in Strasbourg would likely 
 
48  Thus, the terms “parliamentary” and “presidential” alone say nothing about the ac-
tual distribution of power between the branches of government. The notion that in 
the former the parliament and in the latter the president constitute the more influen-
tial institutions in the respective systems – which would seem logical to conclude 
based on their names – overlooks the fact that legislatures, especially in parliamen-
tary systems of government have had to forfeit a great deal of their discrete deci-
sion-making power. Frank Decker/Jared Sonnicksen 
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find themselves in a similarly dissatisfying situation. This begs the question 
of why then they should be interested in parliamentarizing the EP, fusing it 
with the Commission and thus possibly ending up on the losing end of the 
bargain. 
That the European legislature already “behaves” like a presidential system 
can be seen in the MPs’ voting patterns. As studies by Simon Hix, among 
others, have shown, disciplined party-voting is much lower in the EP than 
in national parliamentary systems.
49 Cross-party voting coalitions are not 
uncommon for particular issues such as agriculture or regional policy. At 
the same time, unified party-voting is fairly higher than in the U.S. Con-
gress, which may reflect the European political party traditions and would 
at least not preclude further development toward a parliamentary system. 
When it comes to coalition building however, the EP fully follows the 
presidential functional logic, where coalitions are formed ad hoc, on a vote-
to-vote basis and with shifting majorities. Furthermore, the voting patterns 
vary from policy issue to policy issue and according to voting modus. In 
the third legislative period (1989-1994), over 70 percent of the recorded 
decisions were taken in consensus between the two largest party groups 
(PES and EPP), but a more antagonistic pattern of voting has been develop-
ing along the ideological left-right division. In addition to long-established, 
but now diminishing cooperation between the two largest parties, voting in 
the EP has been increasingly characterised by shifting centre-left and cen-
tre-right alliances usually facilitated by the liberals in the EP (ELDR), who 
are open for voting together with either the social-democrat (PES) or the 
conservative (EPP) party groups. 
Both the underpinning and driving force behind the flexible pattern of vot-
ing in the EP are provided by the multi-party structure, which has consisted 
of no less than eight party groups since the last election in 2004. The multi-
party system also offsets the growing individual party cohesiveness that 
would otherwise be detrimental to the presidential functional logic. Thus, 
from an institutional standpoint, cohesive party voting and flexible, ad-hoc 
 
49  Hix, Simon / Abdul Noury / Gérard Roland (2005): Power to the Parties: Cohesion 
and Competition in the European Parliament, 1979-2001, in: British Journal of Po-
litical Science 35 (2), S. 209-234. The Direct Election of the Commission President 
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coalition-building (as opposed to stable “bloc voting”) represent two sides 
of the same coin. Interestingly, the EU parliamentary practice would re-
main unaffected by the direct election of the Commission President. The 
EP could continue to democratise further as the EU popular chamber (e.g. 
through a more uniform electoral law with greater respect to the principle 
of equal representation), expand its legislative competences relative to the 
Council of Ministers and still maintain its powers of executive control over 
the Commission (including the power to confirm nominated Commission-
ers before appointment). The Commission would in fact become more poli-
ticised, but its institutional integrity and independence, upon which, among 
others, the Community Method is ultimately based, would not even be 
compromised. That independence is a valuable asset, not only in the Com-
mission’s relationship to the member states, but also with the Parliament 
since the Commission needs to consciously refrain from taking a party-
political bias if it hopes to reach broad approval for its proposals.
50 Hence, 
the Commission President is well advised to maintain the necessary bal-
ance when building the Commission team. 
While the parliamentary model could be pursued within the constitutional 
provisions of the EU, it would clearly necessitate realignment in the rela-
tions between the Parliament and Commission. The introduction of a direct 
election of the Commission President on the other hand could be integrated 
into the existing institutional system without having to alter the constitu-
tional practice developed so far. The only formal amendment would entail 
incorporating a necessary provision in the treaties; no other formal changes 
would need to be made to the institutional structure. Admittedly, this would 
give rise to the question on the sense of keeping the newly established 
President of the European Council since a popularly elected Commission 
President would no doubt take on representative tasks along with the regu-
lar executive powers. And, the overall loss to the EU from rescinding this 
additional executive office would probably be negligible, if indeed a “loss” 
at all.  
 
50   Höreth, Marcus (1999): Die Europäische Union im Legitimationstrilemma. Zur 
Rechtfertigung des Regierens jenseits der Staatlichkeit, Baden-Baden, p. 206f. Frank Decker/Jared Sonnicksen 
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With regard to the electoral procedure, two basic versions would be possi-
ble. One would be determined by simple majority or plurality, the other, in 
Romance tradition, by absolute majority. Elections held under the latter 
form of electoral system often require a run-off election, in which the two 
candidates with the highest amount of votes compete against each other. 
Most presidential and semi-presidential systems favour this – and, from a 
democratic standpoint, superior – type of system. Given the high fragmen-
tation of the European party system, the absolute majority rule seems more 
appropriate for the EU as well. In that case, it would be necessary to clarify 
which round of elections takes place concurrently with the EP elections. 
Alternatively, the presidential and parliamentary elections could be held 
completely separately from one another, granted that this would entail the 
possibility of European citizens having to go to the ballot box three times 
within a five-year period. Moreover, this option would increase the prob-
ability of “divided government” or diverging majorities in the executive 
and legislative institutions of Commission and Parliament. As a result, it 
could prove even more difficult for the Commission to find the necessary 
voting majorities in the EP, which is one of the biggest challenges (and po-
tential drawbacks) of the presidential system of government. Here again, it 
is worth noting however that divergent majorities in the separation-of-
powers system must not lead to gridlock, but rather the pattern of flexible, 
ad hoc coalition-building likewise characteristic of presidential systems in 
turn enables governing under such circumstances.   
4.2.  Critique of the Direct-Election Proposal and Possible Counter-
Arguments 
Opponents of this approach to democratising the EU argue that the direct 
election would unduly strain the legitimatory basis of European politics, 
which is grounded in consensus-oriented decision-making among the 
member states. One of the main concerns in this context is the structural 
majority, or in other terms, that the fear of the smaller member states of 
being “overruled” would become even more possible as a consequence of The Direct Election of the Commission President 
 31
the direct election of the EU executive.
51 Certainly the direct election 
would introduce an additional majoritarian element into the consociational 
system of the EU and thus shift it somewhat toward majoritarian democ-
racy. But precisely this sort of shift can hardly be avoided if the EU system 
of government is to become more democratic on the whole. Reflecting on 
these (and similar) critiques, it would seem that Lijphart’s
52 dichotomous 
typology of majoritarian (“Westminster”) vs. consensus democracy may 
have inadvertently nourished a gross misunderstanding, namely, that one 
form of democracy excludes the other, i.e. that a political system can be 
classified as either one or the other. But a generally majoritarian-style de-
mocracy without a minimum of consensus-promoting structures or prac-
tices would in practice prove just as ineffectual as a purely consensus 
democracy without any majoritarian elements. This is reflected for example 
in the procedures for appointing and, in parliamentary systems, removing 
the government as well as for the passage of laws, where decisions are 
taken by simple or absolute majority. This applies without exception to na-
tional consensus democracies like Switzerland, Austria, and the Benelux 
and Nordic countries. In the supranational European Union on the other 
hand, the majority principle applies as of now only to the investiture of the 
Commission and the regular voting procedure in the European Parliament. 
In order to carry a motion of censure against the Commission, a two-thirds 
majority vote is needed in the EP, while the nomination of the Commission 
President in the European Council and legal acts in the Council of Minis-
ters require a qualified majority, in many cases even unanimity. 
Consequently, the direct election of the Commission President would not 
change the overall consensual quality of the European polity. The risk 
posed by a Commission President voted into office by a majority who then 
only governs in the interests of those voters is tremendously low, not least 
because the Commission depends on the broad support of both the Council 
of Ministers, who can safeguard member state interests, and the European 
 
51   Höreth, Marcus (1999): Die Europäische Union im Legitimationstrilemma. Zur 
Rechtfertigung des Regierens jenseits der Staatlichkeit, Baden-Baden, p. 272f. 
52  Lijphart, Arend (1999): Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Perform-
ance in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven / London. Frank Decker/Jared Sonnicksen 
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Parliament in pushing through legislative proposals. Especially in the proc-
ess of negotiating on legal acts, the European Parliament would continue to 
benefit from its institutionally independent position. Also, the claim that 
direct election would lead to a marginalisation of the smaller states is 
(plausible, but) unfounded judging by European political practice. Simon 
Hix for example raises the concern that candidates for the presidency 
would resort to the vote-maximising strategy of focussing on the larger, 
highly populous member states in their campaigns.
53 Yet the extraordinary 
linguistic diversity of Europe alone would make an election campaign im-
possible without the help of the national party organisations to present can-
didates to their respective publics. To be sure, European elections and 
campaigns will maintain their decentralized character, guaranteeing for all 
member states, big and small, a say in the electoral matter. 
Moreover, what applies to the election applies to the nomination of candi-
dates by the European parties. Their primary goal would naturally be to 
present candidates who are well known and respected across Europe and 
thus capable of uniting a majority in the European electorate. It would be 
anything but safe to assume that such candidates from larger member states 
would automatically have a better chance at electoral success. Obviously 
smaller states can generate renowned candidates, as demonstrated in politi-
cians such as Guy Verhofstadt, Wolfgang Schüssel or Jean-Claude Juncker, 
all of whom have been repeatedly sought after as candidates for the highest 
European offices. Not even the nominating procedure would necessarily 
put the bigger member states at an advantage. Quite the opposite could just 
as easily be the case when party organisations from larger states, in insist-
ing on their “own” candidates, mutually block one another, leaving room 
for a tertius gaudens from one of the smaller states to win out in the inter-
nal party nomination process. 
Aside from whether one prescribes to the often feared drawbacks of the 
presidential concept or tries to dispel them, one thing can be deemed cer-
tain. The same issues related to the challenges for nominating and electing 
 
53  Hix, Simon (2002): Why the EU Should have a Single President, and How She 
Should Be Elected, London (Paper for the Working Group on Democracy in the EU 
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candidates in a very diverse Europe would be posed just as much by the 
parliamentary model as the presidential one. In this respect, there is no sig-
nificant difference between establishing a direct election or making the EP 
election an indirect vote for a “prime-minister” type of Commission Presi-
dent, both forms of government appointment being majoritarian in charac-
ter. However, the differences between the two models become rather 
salient when considering the aspect of governing, which at the European 
level, as much as at the national level, takes place primarily through law-
making. And in this respect, a Commission President voted by and respon-
sible to the European Parliament would coincide with the rule of 
majoritarian democracy to a much greater extent than a separate and popu-
larly elected president. A parliamentarized president of the Commission 
and the parliamentary majority would need to enter into a long-term voting 
coalition, which takes a polarising effect on account of the functional logic 
inherent to the fused relationship between executive and legislative and 
could even provoke conflict with the Council of Ministers. By contrast, the 
structural, power-separating design of presidentialism necessitates consen-
sualism. Instead of a lasting coalition between the government and its ma-
jority, short-term voting majorities are formed, changed and reformed, not 
only between various parties and on a cross-party basis, but also between 
institutions. The lack of a solid majority in parliament certainly makes 
“governing” more difficult for the Commission. But for the triangular rela-
tionship between Commission, Council and Parliament, the presidential 
structures provide the advantage of requiring compromise, which is excep-
tionally vital for decision-making in the intergovernmental and suprana-
tional polity of the EU. As opposed to the power-fusing design of a 
parliamentary system, the presidential structure along with the correspond-
ing functional logic conforms to the heterogeneity of European politics.  
The advantages of the presidentialization approach to democratising the EU 
also stem from the majoritarian-democratic dimension. For one, a popularly 
legitimated Commission would find itself in a stronger position to assert its 
initiatives. Accordingly, it could work to counteract potential gridlock in 
the decision-making process, one of the common critiques of presidential-Frank Decker/Jared Sonnicksen 
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ism.
54 At the same time, a substantial increase in legitimacy of European 
politics would emanate from the presidential democratisation. By granting 
citizens the opportunity to vote for a person and a political direction at the 
same time, the popular election of the Commission president would essen-
tially resolve the institutional dimension of the democratic deficit that has 
long afflicted the Community. 
As it currently stands, the institutional system of the EU is only partially 
capable of bringing forth broader policy alternatives within the governing 
process. From the citizen perspective, it seems much more like an arena for 
intergovernmental conflict. And here lies the crux of a democratic election: 
something has to be at stake in the election in order for it to be worth the 
voters’ while, meaning that their decision has to have observable conse-
quences.
55 The direct election would be able to offer precisely that. An EU 
head of government voted popularly into office would bear the prerogative 
and burden of political initiative, and thus could not (easily) shirk or deflect 
responsibility to the bureaucracy or the Council of Ministers. But the presi-
dent’s position as an institutional embodiment of European unity and a rep-
resentative of the Community both at home and abroad would also be duly 
enhanced. What is more, the direct election would put a stop to the previ-
ous “second order” quality of European elections. Not only would the elec-
tion take place as a truly European-wide procedure, which is still not the 
case with EP elections, the competition for votes would itself have a Euro-
 
54  Linz, Juan (1990): The Perils of Presidentialism, in: Journal of Democracy 1 (1), p. 
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55  Of course, the democratic effects described above could also result from linking the 
Commission appointment to the EP elections, as proposed in the parliamentary ap-
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peanizing effect as well: parties would be compelled, after uniting behind a 
single candidate and a single programme, to lead a cross-border joint cam-
paign. Possible candidates for example could be incumbent or former heads 
of government, statespersons or other political figures well known beyond 
the boundaries of their home countries. As a result, a “face” could finally 
be attached to European politics, while the position of Commission Presi-
dent itself would require a campaign held on European issues, and not un-
der the umbrella of national politics. The consequence would be an 
increased pressure for European political mobilisation, that in turn could 
strengthen the sense of community among citizens of the Union, promote 
the development of a European-wide party system and, last but not least, 
have a “spill-over” effect on the elections to the European Parliament.  
5. Conclusion 
Despite its advantages and institutional fit, little attention was paid in the 
constitutional debate to the direct election as an alternative proposal to de-
mocratising the EU. As to why it was disregarded, one possible explanation 
lies in the parliamentary traditions of the member states, which are mostly 
unfamiliar with the presidential model. Another factor is the general suspi-
cion that a popular election of the Commission President would place a 
heavier burden on the consensual structure of the EU than an election by 
the parliament. Although both objections can be refuted upon closer inspec-
tion, they have proven to have the most influence on the political and aca-
demic debate. Given that, the direct election concept barely stood a chance 
in getting adopted, even if notable politicians such as Fischer, Bruton or 
Verhofstadt sympathised with it at one point or another. 
But the finalité of Europe is by no means a “done deal”, nor does the fur-
ther development of the EU system of government along the presidential 
path have to be deemed an impossibility. After the signing of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the EU missed another opportunity to truly democratise its deci-
sion-making system. In concrete terms, democracy in Europe boils down to 
a European government that is responsible and accountable before the 
European voters, which can not be said of the Commission or the Council. Frank Decker/Jared Sonnicksen 
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With regard to the Council, the population of a member state will be con-
sidered more proportionally on account of the Lisbon Treaty, which consti-
tutes a step forward, but this does not change the fact that its members are, 
and will continue to be, only indirectly legitimated. As for the Commission, 
its appointment will remain problematic, in the sense that it can hardly be 
conceived of as a democratic act of election, even if the Treaty refers to it 
as such.  
The time where Europe could focus on output-legitimacy and rely on 
“permissive consensus” has passed. The European leaders were reminded 
of this recently when the people of Ireland rejected the Lisbon Treaty in a 
referendum, making all too clear that the small amount of more democracy 
they promised will not close the legitimacy gap. From the historical per-
spective on democratisation, elites in most cases have only been prepared 
to take reforms when under pressure. Why then should that be any different 
in the European Union? The main problem the Community faces is an 
elite-centred structure that plays, from the European citizen perspective, a 
supporting role at best. The unfinished state of European democracy thus 
requires us to contemplate and deliberate further on how to democratise the 
institutions of the EU. When the window of reform opportunity opens 
again, political science can contribute by providing an appropriate blue-
print, one that addresses, among other things, the question of “parliamen-
tary or presidential?”.  
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